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This paper explores the idea that it is instrumentally valuable to
learn normative truths. We consider an argument for “normative
hedging” based on this principle, and examine the structure of
decision-making under moral uncertainty that arises from it. But it
also turns out that the value of normative information is inconsistent
with the principle that learning empirical truths is instrumentally
valuable. We conclude with a brief comment on “metanormative
regress.”
Learning normative decision theory seems like it would be practically valu-
able. It is reasonable to expect making better decisions to turn out better,
on balance, than making worse decisions. But we have a lot of uncertainty
aboutwhich decisions are better than others, and some of this is attributable
to normative uncertainty. Is risk-aversion rational? Should we assign any
outcomes infinite utility? What about the St. Petersburg paradox, or New-
comb’s puzzle, or Death in Damascus? We expect that improving our un-
derstanding of normative issues will help guide us tomake better decisions.
And we expect that it is worth spending some effort to improve our under-
standing of decision theory—that improving our epistemic situation with
respect to normative questions is instrumentally valuable.
Is this right? It turns out that if it is, it has striking implications for decision-
making under normative uncertainty. First (section 1), the principle that nor-
mative information is instrumentally valuable provides newmotivation for
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the idea that decision theory should give normative uncertainty a special
role: that one should “hedge” between alternative normative theories when
one is uncertain which one is true. It also turns out (in section 2) to be
inconsistent with straightforward applications of the most popular rules
that have previously been offered for handling normative uncertainty; but
it guides us toward a way of refining these rules, and toward structural con-
straints a “metanormative” theory must satisfy. In section 3 we consider a
stronger principle in the same spirit that imposes tighter constraints on such
theories. But in section 4 this strategy for motivating a theory of normative
uncertainty runs into a problem: preferring to know the answers to nor-
mative questions is, in general, inconsistent with also preferring to know
the answers to empirical questions. In section 5 we also briefly consider
implications of the value of normative information for uncertainty about
“metanormative” principles.
I will focus on decision-theoretic uncertainty (for discussion see Nozick
1993, 43–50; MacAskill 2016)—indeed, for the most part, on uncertainty
about a single question in decision theory: whether risk-aversion is ratio-
nal (see also Dietrich and Jabarian, manuscript, 7 and sec. 4; manuscript).
This narrow focus will help keep things tractable, but it is meant to illumi-
nate broader points about uncertainty about normative matters, including
moral uncertainty—such as uncertainty about how good or bad things are
intrinsically, or about whether it is especially wrong to violate rights, or the
moral worth of animals, and so on.1 These are questions we would like
to know the answers to, not merely out of intellectual interest, but out of
ethical interest. The choice to try to learn the answers to such questions is
itself morally important (see MacAskill, Bykvist, and Ord 2020, ch. 9). It is
surprisingly challenging to develop a theory that rationalizes it.
1 Don’t tell me what to do
Let’s start with a simple example (table 1). Rita faces a choice. If she chooses
toGamble, she gives up a sticker, and if a fair coin comes up heads shewins a
free coffee mug. If she chooses to Pass she just keeps her sticker either way.
She assigns utility 96 to winning the mug, utility 32 to just keeping her
1See Hudson (1989); Lockhart (2000); Ross (2006); Guerrero (2007); Sepielli (2009);
MacAskill (2014a), especially ch. 7; MacAskill (2014b); MacAskill and Ord (forthcoming);
Podgorski (2020); MacAskill, Bykvist, and Ord (2020); for overview see Bykvist (2017); for
critical discussion seeHarman (2015); Weatherson (2014); Weatherson (2019); Hedden (2016)
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sticker, and utility 0 to losing out on both. Should she take the gamble?2




Standard expected utility theory (EU) clearly says that Rita should Gamble.
But standard expected utility theory is not the only game in town. Some
decision theorists argue that it can be rational to be risk-averse.3 If this is
right, then it can be permissible to Pass. For concreteness, suppose that
the only alternative to standard risk-neutral expected utility theory is risk-
weighted expected utility theory, where Rita’s “risk function” is, in particular,
𝑟(𝑝) = 𝑝2. Call this REU(𝑝2).4 According to this theory, Gamble’s value is
24, which is less than the value of Pass, 32.5
(To keep things concrete, in this example I am supposing that Rita assigns
numerical utilities on a single scale for both decision theories. These as-
sumptions will be dispensed with later.)
Rita knows that one of these two decision theories is correct—EU or
REU(𝑝2)—but she doesn’t know which.6 Rita considers each theory
equally likely, with probability 1/2.
2This is a gamble at 2 ∶ 1 odds, scaled up by 25 to avoid fractions in subsequent calcula-
tions.
3See for example Allais (1953); Quiggin (1982); Quiggin (1993); Machina (1989); Buchak
(2013). Throughout, by “risk-averse” I mean risk-averse with respect to utility. Standard
EU does permit risk-aversion with respect to goods like money or longevity, but not with
respect to utility.
4Buchak (2013); economists know this as rank-dependent utility theory (RDU) (Quiggin
1993).
5Here’s how to calculate the REU (RDU) of an act. List the possible utilities in ascending
order: 𝑢0 < 𝑢1 < ⋯. For 𝑖 ≥ 1, let 𝑝𝑖 be the cumulative probability of attaining at least
utility 𝑢𝑖. Then the REU is
𝑢0 + 𝑟(𝑝1) ⋅ (𝑢1 − 𝑢0) + 𝑟(𝑝2) ⋅ (𝑢2 − 𝑢1) + ⋯
In this simple case,
REU(Gamble) = 0 + 𝑟(1/2) ⋅ (96 − 0) = (1/2)2 ⋅ 96 = 24
6If the correct decision theory is true a priori, then Rita falls short of “ideal rationality,” in
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Rita has a tough decision to make. But she is in luck: she has the opportu-
nity to consult a decision theory oracle. If she asks, the oracle will tell her
which of the two decision theories is correct, and after that she can choose
whether to take the gamble. This seems like a good opportunity: if she
doesn’t consult the oracle, she doesn’t know whether she will choose ratio-
nally, but if she does consult the oracle, she can guarantee that she will make
the best choice. What’s not to like?
To be clear: we are currently interested in the instrumental value of norma-
tive information. Even if Rita enjoys knowing truths about decision theory
or acting rationally for their own sake, we are setting such considerations
aside.
The standard tool for analyzing this kind of question is the value of infor-
mation.7 We can consider “consult the oracle and then decide” as a compli-
cated act of its own. Rita knows that if she learns that EU is correct, she will
choose Gamble (since she knows this maximizes expected utility), and she
knows that if she learns that REU is correct, she will choose Pass (since she
knows this maximizes risk-weighted expected utility). So her “oracle act”
will have the same result as Gamble if EU is correct, and it will have the
same result as Pass if REU is correct.
So Rita now has three options: Pass, Gamble, or Oracle. The pay-offs of
these options are in table 2. Each state has probability 1/4. (Which decision
theory is correct is independent of the outcome of the coin flip, on Rita’s
evidence.)
Table 2: Utilities for Rita’s three options
EU, Heads EU, Tails REU, Heads REU, Tails
Gamble 96 0 96 0
that there are a priori truths she does not know. But this cognitive limitation does not make
serious trouble. It is difficult to apply the standard Bayesian framework to represent agents
who are in doubt about tautologies, but there is no reason to think that the correct decision
theory is a tautology.
7Some reasons for worrying about whether information always has value do not arise
in this context. We will not discuss cases where one might fail to rationally respond to
new information (for discussion see Briggs 2009). The new information we are discussing is
“transparent:” there are no relevant possibilities where you learn something but fail to know
what it is that you have learned (see Das, forthcoming). We also set aside infinite cases (see
Arntzenius and McCarthy 1997; Arntzenius, Elga, and Hawthorne 2004; Russell and Isaacs,
forthcoming).
4
EU, Heads EU, Tails REU, Heads REU, Tails
Pass 32 32 32 32
Oracle 96 0 32 32
Which of these three options should Rita take? The answer depends on
which decision theory is correct. By hypothesis, the correct decision theory
is one of EU or REU, though Rita doesn’t knowwhich. So we can take them
one by one, and in each case, the calculation is straightforward: see table 3.8






Both EU and REU agree on whether Rita should consult the oracle: no. The
two theories give different verdicts on which option is best. EU ranks the
three optionsGamble >Oracle > Pass, and REU ranks themPass >Gamble >
Oracle. But both agree that Oracle is not the best option—in fact, both agree
that Oracle is worse than Gamble. The risk-averse REU maximizer would
rather not gamble, but by their lights consulting the oracle (and so possibly
taking the gamble) is an even worse gamble than the original gamble.
If either of these two decision theories is correct, Rita should not consult
the oracle. The basic reason for this is a structural feature that both of these
theories have in common. Consulting the oracle amounts to choosing a
mixed strategy: it has a chance of turning out the same way as Gamble, and
a chance of turning out the same way as Pass, and which way it goes is
independent of the outcomes of these acts. But EU and risk-averse REU
8Let’s spell out one of these calculations:
REU(Oracle) = 0 + 𝑟(3/4) ⋅ (32 − 0) + 𝑟(1/4) ⋅ (96 − 32)
= (3/4)2 ⋅ 32 + (1/4)2 ⋅ 64 = 18 + 4
= 22
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both agree that a mixed strategy can be no better than the best of the pure
strategies that comprise it.
The astute readermight wonder whether in the case of EU this result contra-
dicts Good’s Theorem, which says, in a slogan, that information is always
valuable for EU-maximizers (Good 1966; see also Blackwell 1951). But the
theorem only says that information is valuable for those who are certain to
be EU-maximizers. This does not apply to Rita: shemight, for all she knows,
not turn out to be an EU-maximizer. For all she knows, if she asks the oracle
then she will find out that EU is false, and instead be guided by REU.
This technical detail raises an important conceptual point. You might think
that if Rita is sure to choose rationally (after consulting the oracle), and fur-
thermore EU is the correct decision theory, then Rita is sure to maximize
expected utility. But this doesn’t follow: even if EU actually is the correct
decision theory, it does not follow that it is certain to be the correct decision
theory. Since Rita leaves open the possibility that some other decision the-
ory is correct, she leaves open the possibility that she should not follow EU.
In the “counternormative” situation where REU is correct instead of EU,
Rita should Pass. If Rita is sure to do what she knows she should do, then
she might not end up following EU.
At this point you might think: so much the worse for the idea that learning
normative truths is always instrumentally valuable. That’s one lesson you
could draw, and it may turn out to be the right one in the end. But we
shouldn’t declare this idea defeated just yet. An alternative lesson to draw
is that (contrary to the hypothesis of the example) neither EU nor REU(𝑝2) is
the correct decision theory for Rita. In order to respect the idea that gaining
normative information is worthwhile, we need a new decision theory: a
theory of decisions under normative uncertainty.
To be clear, this decision theory would be a rival to standard EU and REU,
not merely a neutral arbiter between them. Both EU and REU say Rita
should not ask the oracle. If Rita should ask the oracle, then both of these the-
ories are wrong. The correct decision theory is one we have not considered
yet.
This sounds a bit different from howmany people writing about normative
uncertainty approach the issue (Sepielli 2009; 2018, 109–10; MacAskill 2016;
MacAskill and Ord, forthcoming; Bykvist 2017). For instance, MacAskill
(2016, 426) writes:
Proponents of metanormativism about moral uncertainty …
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think that there are different senses of ‘ought’: a first-order
moral sense of ‘ought,’ which is not sensitive to a decision
maker’s moral uncertainty, and a different (more subjective or
less idealized) sense of ‘ought’ that takes moral uncertainty into
account.
The proposal is that “metanormative ‘ought’ ” claims, which are sensitive
to normative uncertainty, do not compete with “first-order ‘ought’ ” claims
that are not. There are various ways of explicating what the “metanorma-
tive ‘ought’ ” might be (see Sepielli 2013; MacAskill, Bykvist, and Ord 2020,
20–21).
Here is how I prefer to frame things. What one ought to do depends on a
body of information. When we talk about what you ought to do, normally
we mean with respect to your current information, but not always; different
bodies of information can be made salient in context.9 One can perfectly
well raise to salience bodies of information that include all the normative
facts. I will sometimes do this in what follows (though I will be explicit
rather than relying on context). What one ought to do in light of all of the
normative facts is “not sensitive to a decision maker’s [normative] uncer-
tainty,” and we might say that this is what one ought to do “in a first-order
sense.” This contrasts with what one ought to do in light of just the informa-
tion one actually has, which ordinarily does not include all the normative
facts. I will be exploring the relationship between what one ought to do
under normative uncertainty and what one ought to do given further nor-
mative information.
The theories EU and REU that I have been discussing are not “first-order”
theories in this particular sense. They are theories of how what you should
do depends on your information; these theories don’t give a special place to
normative uncertainty, but that isn’t to say they don’t take it into account
(compare Harman 2015, 70). Indeed, these theories give normative uncer-
tainty a non-trivial role. For example, suppose we offer Rita a simpler bet
(compare Podgorski 2020, 45). We’ll ask the oracle which decision theory is
correct. If the oracle says that REU is correct, Rita gets 10 utils. If the oracle
says EU is correct, Rita loses 2 utils. Should she take this bet? EU says yes:
its expected utility is+4 utils. If EUwas a “first-order” theory of what to do
given all of the normative facts, it would not deliver this verdict. Conditional
9For clear discussion see Broome (1991, 126–29). Compare Kratzer ([1981] 2008); for crit-
ical discussion see Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010, 122–23); see also Pittard and Worsnip
(2016)
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on EU being correct, EU says Rita ought not take this bet: the conditional ex-
pected utility of the bet, given that EU is correct, is−2utils. Sowhat EU says
Rita should do is sensitive to Rita’s uncertainty about whether EU is correct.
Standard EUdoes not give any special deference to REU’s evaluations of acts,
but that isn’t to say it is not sensitive to uncertainty about whether REU is
correct. The question before us is how normative uncertainty is relevant to
what we should do. EU and REU offer answers to this question—but if Rita
should ask the oracle, then their answers are wrong.
I will approach this broad question by asking a narrower question: what
kind of theory could deliver the verdict that learning the correct normative
theory is instrumentally valuable?
2 Aggregating normative theories
Here is a natural idea (Nozick 1993; Lockhart 2000; Ross 2006; Sepielli 2009;
MacAskill 2016; MacAskill and Ord, forthcoming). When we don’t know
howwell an actwill actually turn out, it’s a good idea to aggregate the proba-
bilities and utilities of different outcomes into a single summary value: the
“choiceworthiness” of the act. EU and REU present different theories of
choiceworthiness. Then, if we are uncertain about an act’s actual choicewor-
thiness, maybe it’s a good idea to consider its expected choiceworthiness. In
Rita’s case, where two decision theories have equal probabilities, the obvi-
ous approach is to rank acts according to the average of their standard ex-
pected utility and their risk-weighted expected utility. In general, for any
act 𝐴, define the Expected Choiceworthiness
EC(𝐴) = ∑
𝑖
𝑃(𝑉𝑖 is correct) ⋅ 𝑉𝑖(𝐴)
where𝑉1, …, 𝑉𝑛 are the value functions corresponding to each epistemically
possible normative theory. (Here I make the simplifying assumptions that
there are only finitely many possible theories, and that all of them assign
acts values on the same quantitative scale. These assumptions will soon be
relaxed.)
The theory that says to maximize Expected Choiceworthiness doesn’t ad-
vise consulting the oracle, either.10 This is easy to calculate (table 4). In fact,
10MacAskill (2014a; ch. 7; see also MacAskill, Bykvist, and Ord 2020, ch. 9) argues that
moral information is instrumentally valuable in certain cases, taking Expected Choicewor-
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the average of the EU of the Oracle act and its REU isworse than the average
value for either Gamble or Pass.
Table 4: Values that Expected Choiceworthiness assigns to
each option
EU REU(𝑝2) EC
Gamble 48 24 36
Pass 32 32 32
Oracle 40 22 31
This example makes a broader structural point.11 No decision theory that
always recommends consulting normative oracles can be, in a natural sense,
simply the result of aggregating the unconditional evaluations of epistem-
ically possible decision theories like EU and REU in a way that satisfies
Näive Valuewise Dominance: if every epistemically live theory ranks 𝐴
higher than𝐵, then this decision theory also ranks𝐴 higher than𝐵.12 Rita’s
case shows us that no way of aggregating theories that respects Naïve Val-
uewise Dominance will tell Rita to consult the normative oracle. Both of
the live theories EU and REU rank Gamble over Oracle. So any aggrega-
tion rule that respects Naïve Valuewise Dominance, applied to these two
theories, will also rank Gamble over Oracle.13
thiness maximization for granted. Rita’s case shows that this kind of argument does not
generalize.
11Podgorski (2020, 57) draws the same conclusion from a different, related argument.
12Besides EC, this applies to “My Favorite Theory,” (Gracely 1996; Gustafsson and Torp-
man 2014) “MyFavoriteOption” (seeMacAskill andOrd, forthcoming), and the voting rules
proposed by MacAskill (2016) and Tarsney (2019). (Note that this ordinal strict dominance
principle is a bit different from the one discussed by MacAskill and Ord (forthcoming).)
13 There is another difficulty for EC. Before, we supposed that Rita knows the correct
decision theory is either EU or REU—which implies that one of them is correct. But if Rita
should consult the oracle, then neither is correct. Suppose we modify the case so that Rita
assigns some positive credence to EC, in addition to EU and REU. Now the definition of EC
is circular: EC itself appears as one of the terms on the right-hand side.
EC(𝐴) = 𝑝1 ⋅ EU(𝐴) + 𝑝2 ⋅ REU(𝐴) + 𝑝3 ⋅ EC(𝐴)
where 𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3 are the probabilities of the three theories. But we can still make sense of
this formula as a constraint on EC, which provides an implicit definition. As it happens, this
gives exactly the same result as we get without accounting for the probability of EC:
EC(𝐴) = 𝑝1𝑝1 + 𝑝2
⋅ EU(𝐴) + 𝑝2𝑝1 + 𝑝2
⋅ REU(𝐴)
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That isn’t to say the aggregation approach to normative uncertainty is to-
tally off base. We just have to think carefully about what it is we should
aggregate.
Standard EU doesn’t think very highly of the Oracle act. But that’s because
it doesn’t think very highly of how the Oracle act turns out in cases where
EU is not the correct decision theory. We might say to EU: who asked you?
Who cares what EU says about cases where EU is false? It would be irra-
tional to be guided by EU in such cases!
Maybe it makes more sense to try to aggregate decision theories prop-
erly construed as first-order theories. Theories like EU and REU offer
conditional evalutions of acts given various bodies of information. The
“first-orderization” of a theory 𝑉 like this consists of the evaluations that
𝑉 offers conditional on 𝑉 being the correct decision theory. The idea is that
instead of trying to aggregate the “global” evaluations different possible
decision theories offer—in effect, deferring to each theory’s own account of
decisions under normative uncertainty—we should instead aggregate just
their “first-order” evaluations, in this sense. We care about what EU says
about how to aggregate the values of cases where EU is correct; we don’t
have to listen to what it says about how to aggregate the values of other
possible cases.14
Here is an example of a theory like this.15 Instead of taking the expected un-
conditional value delivered by each decision theory, instead we can consider
the expected conditional value. For any act 𝐴, let
ECC(𝐴) = ∑
𝑖
𝑃(𝑉𝑖 is correct) ⋅ 𝑉𝑖(𝐴 ∣ 𝑉𝑖 is correct)
where 𝑉1, …, 𝑉𝑛 are the value functions corresponding to each epistemi-
cally possible decision theory. Call this Expected Conditional Choicewor-
(as long as 𝑝3 ≠ 1).
A similar issue arises for the Naïve Valuewise Dominance principle. If the correct nor-
mative theory is itself one of the live possibilities, then this principle is trivial: if every live
theory ranks 𝐴 over 𝐵, and the correct theory is one of those, then of course it ranks𝐴 over
𝐵. The principle that we must give up is that if every other live theory besides the correct
one ranks 𝐴 over 𝐵, then so does the correct theory. EC satisfies this principle as well.
14This way of thinking about “first-order” decision theories is partly inspired by the dis-
cussion of first-order and higher-order uncertainty by Dorst (2020).
15Podgorski (2020, 58) proposes essentially this theory; he calls his version “Maximize
Inter-Theoretic Conditional Expectation (MITCE).” The relationship between EC and ECC is
analogous to the contrast Elga (2013) draws between Rational Reflection and New Rational
Reflection.
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thiness, or ECC.16 This is obviously very similar in spirit to the Expected
Choiceworthiness formula. In cases where the outcomes of the acts in ques-
tion don’t depend at all on which normative theory is correct, the two the-
ories coincide. But the modified theory handles acts like Oracle very differ-
ently.
This theory does respect the value of normative information. Let’s look at
Rita’s case again. The values that ECC assigns to Gamble and Pass are the
same as EC (because the outcomes of Gamble and Pass are independent of
which decision theory is correct). But the Oracle act goes differently, since
its outcome depends on which decision theory is correct. If EU is correct,
then the Oracle act goes the same way as Gamble. So
EU(Oracle ∣ EU is correct) = EU(Gamble ∣ EU is correct) = 48
If REU is correct, then the Oracle act goes the same way as Pass, instead. So
REU(Oracle ∣ REU is correct) = REU(Pass ∣ REU is correct) = 32
So ECC(Oracle) = 40 (the average of 48 and 32). This is better than either
Gamble or Pass, as we hoped (table 5). The basic reason for this is that
the Oracle act gets the best of both worlds: its score is the average of the EU
score for the best EU-scoring act and the REU score for the best REU-scoring
act. This has to be at least as good as the average of any single act’s EU score
and its REU score.
Table 5: Values that Expected Conditional Choiceworthiness
assigns to each option
EU REU(𝑝2) EC ECC
Gamble 48 24 36 36
Pass 32 32 32 32
Oracle 40 22 31 40
16The issue raised in footnote 13 arises again: if ECC is itself one of the epistemically possi-
ble theories, then this would be a circular definition. But it still provides a perfectly sensible
constraint on a decision theory—we should read it this way, rather than as a complete theory
of its own. This tells us the unconditional values of an act in terms of the conditional, “first-
order” values each theory assigns the act—including the correct first-order theory, whatever
it may be.
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This holds in general: ECC always permits consulting normative oracles
when they are available. (ECC requires consulting normative oracles when-
ever this might make a difference to one’s eventual choice.) There are also
other rules of this same general form that use different aggregationmethods
besides the simple expectation: for example, we could have used a “second-
order” risk-weighted expectation instead of the standard expectation. Rules
like this also recommend consulting normative oracles. What’smore, a kind
of converse also holds: if normative information is valuable, decision the-
ory under normative uncertainty must take this general form. In the rest
of this section I will spell out this idea precisely and explain some of its
consequences.
First a bit of technical set-up. Consider a finite set 𝒮 of states, and a set 𝒪 of
outcomes.17 A proposition is a set of states. Acts are functions from states
to outcomes. For an act 𝐴 and a proposition 𝐸, let the partial act 𝐴|𝐸 be
the restriction of 𝐴 to 𝐸.
Let a normative theory be a function that takes each non-null proposition
𝐸 to an ordering of acts ≳𝐸. Intuitively, 𝐴 ≳𝐸 𝐵 means that act 𝐴 is at
least as good a choice as act 𝐵 given the information 𝐸. (The unconditional
ordering 𝐴 ≳ 𝐵 is 𝐴 ≳𝒮 𝐵.) We will assume that each normative theory’s
ordering ≳𝐸 only depends on what happens when 𝐸 obtains: if 𝐴|𝐸 =
𝐵|𝐸 then 𝐴 ∼𝐸 𝐵.18 We will also assume these orderings satisfy some
standard technical conditions.19
For each state 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, let ≳𝑠𝐸 be the normative theory which is correct at
𝑠. For each 𝑠 ∈ 𝒮, let 𝑉 (𝑠) intuitively represent the proposition that the
𝑠-theory is correct: this is the set of states 𝑠′ such that ≳𝑠𝐸 and ≳𝑠
′
𝐸 agree
17Intuitively, we will think of each state as having positive probability. If some states
in 𝒮 don’t represent genuinely “live” possibilities, then the principles that follow require
qualification.
18This principle is sometimes called consequentialism, but it is not the only such principle;
note that this principle is compatible with risk-aversion (for discussion see Hammond 1988;
Machina 1989; Buchak 2013, ch. 6).
19 In particular, the conditions for Debreu’s ordinal utility representation theorem (1954,
1959): the set of outcomes has the structure of a connected separable topological space, and
each of the orderings is transitive, total, and continuous. These technical assumptions sim-
plify our discussion, by allowing us to treat each theory as assigning values that are at least
ordinally representable by real numbers. But note that we are effectively supposing that no
epistemically live theory allows intransitivity, incompleteness, or infinite utilities. This is a
strong assumption. I do not think that the core lessons of this paper depend on it, but drop-
ping it will lead us to consider non-standard value representations—such as vector utility
and multi-utility representations. These complications are best left for later.
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(for every 𝐸). Let 𝑠∗ ∈ 𝒮 be the actual state. We’ll use the shorthand ≳∗ for
the ordering ≳𝑠∗ .
When Rita consults the decision theory oracle, she learns which normative
theory is correct. She will then choose an act recommended by that theory.
But in general this may not be the act that the theory recommended before
she consulted the oracle. She has new information now, and this can make
a difference to what she should choose. So she will choose an act which
is recommended by the theory that turns out to be correct, given this new
information that this theory is correct.
Let 𝒜 be any finite set of acts. Call an act 𝐴 𝒜-oracular iff for each state 𝑠,
there is some act 𝐵 ∈ 𝒜 such that 𝐴|𝑉 (𝑠) = 𝐵|𝑉 (𝑠) and
𝐵 ≳𝑠𝑉 (𝑠) 𝐵′ for each act 𝐵′ ∈ 𝒜
Intuitively, this is an act that consists in choosing whichever act is recom-
mended by the correct normative theory, given the information that this
theory is correct. Our principle is that an act like this is at least as good as
any of the originally available acts. A stronger version is that consulting the
oracle is strictly better than committing to an act in advance, unless there is
already an available act which we know in advance will be the best option
no matter which theory turns out to be true.
Value of Normative Information. Let𝒜 be any set of acts and let𝐴 be any
act.
(Weak) For each act 𝐵 ∈ 𝒜, if 𝐴 is 𝒜-oracular, then 𝐴 ≳∗ 𝐵
(Strong) If furthermore 𝐵 is not 𝒜-oracular, then 𝐴 >∗ 𝐵.
Valuewise Dominance. Let 𝐴 and 𝐵 be any acts.
(Weak) If 𝐴 ≳𝑠𝑉 (𝑠) 𝐵 for each state 𝑠, then 𝐴 ≳∗ 𝐵.
(Strong) If furthermore there is some state 𝑠 such that𝐴 >𝑠𝑉 (𝑠) 𝐵, then
𝐴 >∗ 𝐵.
A function 𝑢 from acts to real numbers (ordinally) represents an ordering
≳ of acts iff
𝐴 ≳ 𝐵 iff 𝑢(𝐴) ≥ 𝑢(𝐵) for any acts 𝐴 and 𝐵
In the case of EU and REU,we specified the orderings byway of real-valued
functions that represent those orderings.
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Aggregation. Let ≳1, ≳2, … list all of the distinct orders ≳𝑠𝑉 (𝑠) for each
state 𝑠. There are functions 𝑢1, 𝑢2, … such that each 𝑢𝑖 represents ≳𝑖,
and there is a function 𝑓 from tuples of real numbers to real numbers,
such that the function that takes each act 𝐴 to 𝑓(𝑢1(𝐴), 𝑢2(𝐴), …)
ordinally represents the unconditional ordering ≳∗. Furthermore:
(Weak) If 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑦, then
𝑓(𝑥1, …, 𝑥𝑖, …) ≥ 𝑓(𝑥1, …, 𝑦, …)
(Strong) If 𝑥𝑖 > 𝑦, then
𝑓(𝑥1, …, 𝑥𝑖, …) > 𝑓(𝑥1, …, 𝑦, …)
Proposition 1.
(a) Weak Value of Normative Information, Weak Valuewise Dominance, and
Weak Aggregation are equivalent.
(b) Strong Value of Normative Information, Strong Valuewise Dominance, and
Strong Aggregation are equivalent.20
Aggregation tells us that normative theories can be split up into two levels:
a “first-order” theory and a “second-order” theory, which are autonomous
from one another. The first-order part of a normative theory tells us how
20Proof Sketch.
Value of Normative Information implies Valuewise Dominance. Let 𝐴 and 𝐵 be acts such that
𝐴 ≳𝑠𝑉 (𝑠) 𝐵 for each state 𝑠. Then 𝐴 is {𝐴, 𝐵}-oracular. So Weak Value of Normative
Information implies 𝐴 ≳∗ 𝐵. If furthermore 𝐴 >𝑠𝑉 (𝑠) 𝐵 for some state 𝑠, then 𝐵 is not
{𝐴, 𝐵}-oracular. So Strong Value of Normative Information implies 𝐴 >∗ 𝐵.
Valuewise Dominance implies Value of Normative Information. Let 𝐴 be 𝒜-oracular, and let
𝐵 ∈ 𝒜. So 𝐴 ≳𝑠𝑉 (𝑠) 𝐵 for each state 𝑠, and Weak Valuewise Dominance implies 𝐴 ≳∗ 𝐵.
If furthermore 𝐵 is not 𝒜-oracular, then 𝐴 >𝑠𝑉 (𝑠) 𝐵 for some state 𝑠, and so 𝐴 >∗ 𝐵.
Valuewise Dominance is equivalent to Aggregation. Debreu (1954, Theorem I) tells us that
(given the technical assumptions in footnote 19) each of the orders ≳𝑖 is representable by a
utility function𝑢𝑖, and also that≳∗ is representable by a utility function𝑈 . WeakValuewise
Dominance then tells us that, for any acts 𝐴 and 𝐵, if 𝑢𝑖(𝐴) ≥ 𝑢𝑖(𝐵) for each 𝑖, then
𝑈(𝐴) ≥ 𝑈(𝐵). Applying this in both directions, if 𝑢𝑖(𝐴) = 𝑢𝑖(𝐵) for each 𝑖, then
𝑈(𝐴) = 𝑈(𝐵). So there is a function 𝑓 such that 𝑈(𝐴) = 𝑓(𝑢1(𝐴), 𝑢2(𝐴), …). It is
clear that Weak/Strong Valuewise Dominance implies that 𝑓 is weakly/strongly increasing
in each argument. The converse is clear. (Note that the “Strong” case follows from Gorman
(1968, Theorem 2).)
14
it orders acts conditional on its own correctness. The second-order part of
the theory is its unconditional ordering; for a theory that satisfies Value of
Normative Information this can be represented with an aggregation func-
tion 𝑓 that combines the verdicts of different possible first-order theories.
The actually correct first-order theory supplies one argument to this aggre-
gation function, and otherwise plays no special role in determining what
you should do unconditionally.
These two pieces are separate: you can pick any first-order theory and com-
bine it with any aggregation function, so far as anything we’ve said so far
goes. For example, there can be a decision theory that agrees with the
first-order judgments of EU (that is, the conditional ordering ≳𝑠𝑉 (𝑠) is rep-
resented by the conditional expected utility function 𝐸𝑈(– ∣ 𝑉 (𝑠))) and
whose aggregation function is given by REU(𝑝2), giving extra weight to
theories that evaluate an act as worse. There is another decision theory
that works the other way around. Both of these combinations satisfy Value
of Normative Information. (For general discussion of metanormative risk-
aversion, see Dietrich and Jabarian, manuscript.)
While Aggregation is permissive, it imposes some real constraints. First,
we have already noted that it is incompatible with simple Expected
Choiceworthiness—it requires that we aggregate conditional evaluations. It
also rules out both of the following principles:
First-Order Actualism. 𝐴 ≳∗ 𝐵 iff 𝐴 ≳∗𝑉 (𝑠∗) 𝐵, for all acts 𝐴, 𝐵.
My Favorite First-Order Theory. 𝐴 ≳∗ 𝐵 iff 𝐴 ≳𝑠𝑉 (𝑠) 𝐵, for all acts 𝐴, 𝐵,
where 𝑠 is a state such that 𝑉 (𝑠) has the highest probability.
Both of these principles violate StrongValuewiseDominance. If the actually
correct first-order theory (or the most probable first-order theory) is indif-
ferent between 𝐴 and 𝐵, then 𝐴 and 𝐵 will be indifferent unconditionally
even if all the other live theories break the tie in the same way. Strong Ag-
gregation requires that we give every live theory at least a little say—at least
as a tie-breaker.21
proposition 1 has nothing special to do with risk-aversion. The live norma-
tive theories in question could be any ways of ranking acts, and they could
21 Compare MacAskill and Ord (forthcoming, 7–8). Note that Aggregation is compati-
ble with lexical aggregation, where there is some “importance” ordering on theories, and
each theory’s verdicts only make a difference as tie-breaking consideration when all of the
more important theories have ties. (Gustafsson and Torpman 2014 defend a theory with this
structure.)
15
differ in many different important respects. We have considered theories
that disagree about how to weigh outcomes, but this framework also ap-
plies to theories that disagree about how valuable different particular out-
comes are. How bad is animal suffering? How good are large populations?
It seems plausible that it would be instrumentallymorally valuable to know
the answers to such questions. If this is so, then we should not just act so as
to promote whatever is actually good (because Strong Value of Normative
Information conflicts with First-Order Actualism); rather we should aggre-
gate the various live possible first-order theories of the good in a way that
gives each of them at least a bit of say.
3 Additive Aggregation
So far we have considered consequences of the principle that you should
learn the completely specific normative truth, given the opportunity. A
stronger principle suggests itself: you should also take opportunities to
learn less complete normative truths. This principle requires that the
aggregation function takes a more specific form: in fact, it pushes us pretty
close to Expected Conditional Choiceworthiness.
A normative proposition 𝑁 is, intuitively, a proposition entirely about the
question of which normative theory is correct: for any state 𝑠, if 𝑉 (𝑠) is
consistent with 𝑁 then 𝑉 (𝑠) entails 𝑁 . We’ll continue to consider cases
that are idealized enough that you know what you would do with new
information if you got it. But now we won’t assume that you know you
will do what you should do: if 𝑁 provides only incomplete normative in-
formation, then you may not know what you should do, and you might
do something else instead. Let 𝐴 ≳𝑁 𝐵 mean that, given the normative
information 𝑁 (and nothing else), you would choose act 𝐴 over 𝐵. This or-
dering should satisfy the same technical conditions as before (footnote 19).
In particular, we assume it is “consequentialist” in the sense that for any
acts 𝐴 and 𝐵, if 𝐴|𝑁 = 𝐵|𝑁 then 𝐴 ∼𝑁 𝐵. We assume that in the case
where 𝑁 = 𝑉 (𝑠) for some state 𝑠, this agrees with what we said before:
𝐴 ≳𝑁 𝐵 iff 𝐴 ≳𝑠𝑉 (𝑠) 𝐵. Then the general principle that it is valuable to
learn whether a normative proposition 𝑁 is true can be written as another
dominance-style principle.
Value of General Normative Information. For any normative proposition
𝑁 ,
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(Weak) If 𝐴 ≳𝑁 𝐵 and 𝐴 ≳¬𝑁 𝐵, then 𝐴 ≳∗ 𝐵.
(Strong) Furthermore, if 𝐴 >𝑁 𝐵 and 𝐴 ≳¬𝑁 𝐵, then 𝐴 >∗ 𝐵.
This is a strong constraint on decision theory under normative uncertainty.
In fact, given our other background assumptions it requires that this theory
is something in the same family as Expected Conditional Choiceworthiness.
Additive Aggregation. There are utility functions 𝑢1, 𝑢2, … from acts to
real numbers such that each distinct ordering ≳𝑠𝑉 (𝑠) is represented by
some function 𝑢𝑖, and the sum
𝑈(𝐴) = 𝑢1(𝐴) + 𝑢2(𝐴) + ⋯
represents ≳∗.
Proposition 2. Strong Value of General Normative Information and Additive Ag-
gregation are equivalent.22
Additive Aggregation includes Expected Conditional Choiceworthiness as
a special case, but it is less constrained. First, while it permits weighing
theories by their probabilities (by appropriately scaling the utility function
𝑢𝑖) this is not required.23 More importantly, the utility functions 𝑢𝑖 don’t
have to match any “internal” cardinal choiceworthiness functions the the-
ories themselves might deploy, like standard expected utilities or REU val-
ues. They are only required to represent the ordinal rankings of acts de-
livered by those theories. The live theories don’t even have to assign any
cardinal utilities to acts “internally”—the framework only relies on ordinal
rankings. And unlike ECC, Additive Aggregation doesn’t depend on any
pre-established “inter-theoretic comparisons of value.”24
22Value of General Normative Information implies that each normative proposition is sep-
arable (see section 4). Then (Gorman 1968, Theorem 2) implies that the unconditional order
of acts is represented by a sum of subutilities which are defined on the “atomic” normative
propositions, namely the propositions 𝑉 (𝑠); these subutility functions represent the orders
≳𝑠𝑉 (𝑠).
23The official framework laid out in section 2 is one of (unquantified) “uncertainty” rather
than (quantified) “risk”—we have not actually assumed that any probabilities are given at
all.
24Such comparisons are one of the standard difficulties “metanormative” decision the-
ories face (Hedden 2016; MacAskill 2014b; Ross 2006; Sepielli 2009; Carr, forthcoming).
Note that while our framework didn’t take any such comparisons for granted, Additive Ag-
gregation imposes structure that allows some interesting intertheoretic cardinal comparison
(compare Riedener 2019, 2020; see also Dietrich and Jabarian, manuscript). The functions
𝑢1, 𝑢2, … are unique up to positive affine transformations with the same scaling constant
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While Additive Aggregation does not push us to a unique aggregation rule,
it is constrained enough to rule out many theories. For example, the risk-
weighted expectation is not additively separable in this way.25
4 Normative information or empirical information?
You might think that learning the correct normative theory is instrumen-
tally valuable because learning new information is instrumentally valuable
across the board. This natural thought is untenable. In fact, always valuing
normative information is inconsistent with always valuing empirical infor-
mation.26
To bemore precise, this inconsistency holds as long as it is epistemically pos-
sible that risk-aversion is rational. The basic reason is that risk-averse deci-
sion theories like REU(𝑝2) sometimes recommend avoiding empirical infor-
mation (see Wakker 1988; Buchak 2010; 2013, 171ff.; Briggs 2016; Campbell-
Moore and Salow, forthcoming; Salow, forthcoming). New information
can be misleading: it can lead you to make a decision that unluckily turns
out worse than the one you would have made otherwise. In standard risk-
neutral decision theory, the risk of being thus misled by new information
is always balanced off by the ways in which the more informed decision
can turn out better. But risk-averse agents may not regard this trade-off as
acceptable.
If you think risk-aversion might be rational, and you always respect the
value of normative information, then there are possible circumstances in
which you prefer to avoid empirical information. But it turns out that this
merely possible information-avoidance also infects the actual value of empir-
ical information. If information might not always be valuable, then it isn’t
always valuable.
This form of argument is familiar from the moral uncertainty literature.
Lockhart (2000) argues that if abortion might be impermissible, then it
should not be performed. Guerrero (2007) argues that if animals might
have moral status, then we should not kill them. MacAskill, Bykvist,
(see Broome 1991, 74–75). This standardizes a way of trading off gains in utility given one
first-order normative theory against losses in utility given another.
25For any risk function other than 𝑟(𝑝) = 𝑝, which reduces to the standard expectation.
Note that Additive Aggregation also rules out lexical aggregation (footnote 21).
26The argument in this section only relies on theValue of (Specific)Normative Information
principle from section 2, not the Value of General Normative Information from section 3.
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and Ord (2020, ch. 8) object to these arguments; but they go on to offer
several structurally paralel arguments of their own. If it might be that
you should give special weight to the well-being of friends over that of
strangers, then it really is appropriate to give them some (lesser) special
weight.27 If it might be that you should prioritize the worst off, then it is
appropriate to prioritize the worst off to some extent. If there might be
objective goods besides people’s welfare, then it actually is appropriate
to promote those other considerations. And so on.28 The argument in
this section has a similar form: it says that if it might be rational to avoid
information, then it is rational to avoid information—either empirical or
normative. One distinctive feature of this argument is that it relies on
much weaker assumptions about normative uncertainty than the other
arguments just mentioned—we need not take for granted anything as
strong as maximizing expected choiceworthiness.
We can show the conflict with another example. Rico is undecided between
two decision theories, EU1 and REU1. The first-order evaluations of EU1
agree with standard EU theory: that is, EU1 ranks 𝐴 ≳ 𝐵 iff EU(𝐴 ∣
EU1 is correct) ≥ EU(𝐵 ∣ EU1 is correct). The first-order evaluations of
REU1 agree with REU(𝑝2), in the same sense. Rico faces a more compli-
cated gamble. Its pay-off depends on the outcome of two fair coin flips and
which decision theory is correct, as in table 6. (The decision theory oracle
has agreed to help settle the bet.)
Table 6: Utilities of the outcomes for a more complicated
gamble
EU1 REU1
Heads, Heads 23 96
Heads, Tails 23 0
Tails, Heads 23 32
Tails, Tails 23 32
Rico faces the following choice: he can commit to Gamble, or he can commit
to Pass and keep utility 23 no matter what. But he also has a third option:
27“Appropriate” is their preferred term for the actions that are recommended by a theory
of moral uncertainty.
28These arguments are also reminiscent of the modal ontological argument: if a necessary
being could exist, it does exist.
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Learn how the first coin landed, and then choose whether to Gamble or Pass.
If empirical information has instrumental value, then Rico should choose
to Learn. But we can show that the value of normative information implies
that Rico should commit to Pass instead. For any act 𝐴 (or partial act), let
EU1(𝐴) denote the “first-order” value EU(𝐴 ∣ EU1 is correct), and simi-
larly let REU1(𝐴) = REU(𝐴 ∣ REU1 is correct).
First, it is easy to calculate:
EU1(Gamble) = 23
REU1(Gamble) = 22 < 23
So by Strong Valuewise Dominance, Pass >∗ Gamble.
Second, we can show that after Rico finds out how the coin lands he should
choose to Gamble, either way. Let 𝐻 be the proposition that the first coin
lands Heads. Then again we can calculate:
EU1(Gamble ∣ 𝐻) = 23
REU1(Gamble ∣ 𝐻) = 24 > 23
EU1(Gamble ∣ ¬𝐻) = 23
REU1(Gamble ∣ ¬𝐻) = 32 > 23
So by Strong Valuewise Dominance, first for values conditional on 𝐻 , and
then for values conditional on ¬𝐻 , we have:
Gamble >∗𝐻 Pass
Gamble >∗¬𝐻 Pass
Either way, Rico should choose to Gamble.
Rico knows this; so Rico knows that Learn will have the same outcome as
Gamble, no matter what. So Learn is strictly worse than committing to Pass
without getting the information about the coin flip. Rico should Pass rather
than Learn, avoiding empirical information.
Moral. Valuing normative information conflicts with valuing empirical infor-
mation.
Here is a more general argument for this moral. (The following draws on
ideas from Broome 1991, ch. 4; Debreu 1959; Gorman 1968.) In general,
value of information principles imply corresponding separability principles.
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A proposition 𝐸 is separable (for an ordering of acts ≳) iff there exists an
ordering ≳𝐸 of partial acts defined on 𝐸 such that, for any acts 𝐴 and 𝐵
whose restrictions to ¬𝐸 are the same (𝐴|¬𝐸 = 𝐵|¬𝐸), we have 𝐴 ≳ 𝐵
iff 𝐴|𝐸 ≳𝐸 𝐵|𝐸.
If empirical information has value, this tells us that each empirical propo-
sition 𝐸 is separable. Given Strong Value of Normative Information, this
implies that 𝐸 is also separable for each first-order normative theory. In gen-
eral, though, empirical propositions are not separable for risk-averse theo-
ries like REU. So this requires that no such theories are live possibilities.
Proposition 3. Given Strong Value of Normative Information, if 𝐸 is separable
for ≳∗ then for each state 𝑠, 𝐸 is separable for ≳𝑠𝑉 (𝑠).29
We might also suppose that the empirical propositions cross-cut the norma-
tive propositions: each state is determined by an empirical proposition to-
gether with a normative proposition. In that case, the two value of informa-
tion principles together imply that every proposition is separable. This im-
plies that the ordering is in fact additively separable over states: if the states
are 𝑠1, 𝑠2, …, there are functions 𝑢1, 𝑢2, … from outcomes to real numbers,
such that ≳∗ is represented by the function that takes each act 𝐴 to
𝑢1(𝐴(𝑠1)) + 𝑢2(𝐴(𝑠2)) + ⋯
(Again see Broome 1991, ch. 4.) This statewise additivity is a stronger
constraint than normative-theory-wise Additive Aggregation principle
discussed in section 4. It amounts to requiring that the only live normative
theories are standard expected utility at the first order, with only the choice
of probabilities and utilities left open (though the utility functions may be
“state-dependent”), and that these first-order expected utilities are then
themselves aggregated simply by adding them up.
If any live first-order theories are non-additive, we have a conflict between
two very similar, and similarly compelling principles. Which should go?
Maybe it’s time to give up on the Value of Normative Information: if empir-
ical information really does have value, but we are uncertain about whether
risk-aversion is rational, and thus about whether empirical information has
value, thenwe should not always consult normative oracles. Moreover, this
implies that Aggregation is false. In general, we cannot consistently value
information while also simultaneously deferring (even a little, even as a
29This follows from results in Gorman (1968).
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tie-breaker) to theories that do not value information. Thus a standard “dy-
namic consistency” argument for expected utility theory becomes an argu-
ment against aggregative theories of normative uncertainty.
Alternatively, we might run this argument the other way: maybe norma-
tive information takes precedence over empirical information. It may still
be true that the correct first-order normative theory respects empirical infor-
mation. Perhaps, when the actual normative facts are known, we should
maximize EU. But if for all we know the correct normative theory might not
respect the value of empirical information, then we ought to hedge.
Either one of these conclusions would teach an important abstract lesson:
uncertainty about normative principles is structurally different from em-
pirical uncertainty. (This echoes Weatherson 2019, 39.) The two kinds of
uncertainty do not have the same significance for information-gathering.30
One other possibility is that each principle undermines the support for the
other. We might take this conflict to point us toward more permissive nor-
mative theories like REU that sometimes recommend avoiding information.
Rationally avoiding information is weird.31 But perhaps it is unavoidable.
I don’t know which of these lessons is correct: I find the conflict between
the value of normative information and the value of empirical information
quite puzzling.
5 Metanormative uncertainty
There is a standard regress objection to the project of theorizing about
normative uncertainty (Weatherson 2014, 155–57). Whatever the correct
“metanormative” theory is, couldn’t it be doubted too? And doesn’t this
call for a theory of decisions under “metanormative uncertainty”—and so
on indefinitely?
In our framework, a normative theory 𝑉 includes a “first-order” theory—
𝑉 ’s prescriptions conditional on the correctness of𝑉 —and a “second-order”
30I speak of “normative principles” here because the argument leaves open that empirical
information and some kinds of normative information both have value. While statewise
additivity rules out deferring to risk-averse decision theories, it is compatible with deferring
to alternative theories of the value of outcomes. (Consider the “ex post expectationalism”
discussed by Dietrich and Jabarian, manuscript, 12; compare also MacAskill, Bykvist, and
Ord 2020, 107–8; Tarsney, Manuscript.)
31Even Buchak (2013, 199) concedes that it is “somewhat unpalatable.”
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part, which gives 𝑉 ’s unconditional prescriptions. Uncertainty about either
one of these parts is uncertainty about whether 𝑉 is correct. “Metanorma-
tive” uncertainty is thus a kind of normative uncertainty.
Aggregative theories (as in section 2) say that there is some aggregation
function, and some utility functions representing each first-order normative
theory , and you should do whatever maximizes the aggregate value. And
if you don’t know which function that is? Aggregative theories don’t care.
They give no place to any kind of “second-order aggregation,” whichwould
somehow aggregate different aggregation functions. What you should
do (unconditionally) is determined by the actually correct aggregation
function together with the live normative theories’ first-order evaluations,
conditional on their own correctness. Other kinds of normative uncertainty
don’t make any difference to what you should do.
What about the value of “metanormative” information? Simple reasoning
by analogy might suggest that just as preferring to learn the answers to
normative questions led to a theory that aggregates first-order normative
theories, preferring to learn the answers tometanormative questions—about
which aggregation function is correct—would lead to a theory of “second-
order aggregation.” But it doesn’t work out that way. In our framework,
“metanormative” questions are themselves normative questions. Additive
theories (as in section 3) recommend learning arbitrary normative informa-
tion when the opportunity arises, and so, in particular, such theories recom-
mend learning “metanormative” information. This is despite the fact that
additive theories don’t include any “second-order aggregation” of different
possible aggregation functions. In this respect, theValue ofNormative Infor-
mation pushes us toward the side of the “actualist” (Harman 2015; Weath-
erson 2014, 2019; Hedden 2016). The correct theory of what you should do
is the correct theory of what you should do.
You can be genuinely uncertain about you should do. The value of norma-
tive information leads to the view thatwhat you should do is determined by
some way of aggregating the evaluations of competing epistemically possi-
ble first-order theories. But this was not motivated by the idea that there
is some sense in which you can tell what you “really” should do in some
more “action-guiding” sense. (Contrast Sepielli 2018, 113; MacAskill and
Ord, forthcoming, 5.) The question of what to do when we face normative
uncertainty is not hostage to the presumption that what we should do is
always knowable (for critical discussion of this idea see Srinivasan 2015).
Tragically often there is no way of knowing for sure what you should do. If
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it is instrumentally valuable to learn normative truths, then this uncertainty
matters for what you actually should do. But that does not provide any rea-
son for optimism that uncertainty about we should do can be escaped.
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